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Specifically, we first conduct the following test:. We then compare the number of censored images from the previous test to that of the following test:. The difference between these two tests is that in the image side-channel test , we first send an image among the non-China-registered accounts before sending it to a China-registered account, whereas in the image control test , we send the image to a China-registered account without sending it to non-China-registered accounts first.

If there is a significantly larger number of images censored in the image side-channel test , then we can conclude that sending images among non-China-registered accounts is facilitating real-time Chinese censorship. We use statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether there is a statistically significant increase in the number of images censored in the image side-channel test than in the image control test.

Namely, we perform a chi-squared test 17 under the null hypothesis that sending images from non-China-registered accounts to non-China-registered accounts does not affect the probability that they will be censored in real-time when they are later sent to a China-registered account.

For each image test, we send n novel images. Our desire is to choose an n high enough that our statistical test has sufficient power to determine whether content surveillance between non-China-registered accounts exists. However, we also want n to be sufficiently low to minimize the risk of WeChat taking adverse action against our testing accounts e. In principle, we could use entirely different sensitive documents and images. However, this approach would limit us to only performing as many file transmissions as we have known sensitive files. Thus, to facilitate testing, we generate novel, sensitive files by performing subtle modifications to a single sensitive document and a single sensitive image; we call each of these seed files.

In the remainder of this section, we explain, for both documents and images, which seed file we use and how we generate novel copies of a seed file such that the derivative files remain sensitive. To create a novel, still-sensitive copy of it, we then append 64 alphanumeric characters chosen uniformly at random. For images, we use as our seed file a cartoon of Liu Xiaobo see Figure 6 that was found to be censored on WeChat in previous work To create a novel, still-sensitive copy of it, we append 24 KiB of random bytes to it.

Since the seed file we used was a JPEG-encoded image, all data past the JPEG end-of-file marker is ignored when rendering the image; however, the appended data still causes the file to hash to a different value. We ran our experiment to test for document and image file surveillance across three separate days: November 27, December 2, and December 6, We spread the experiment across three days to ensure that the behaviour we observed was consistent across time and to reduce the risk of adverse action taken against our test accounts.

All measurements were performed from a University of Toronto network in Toronto, Canada. For each test, on each day, we transmitted novel, sensitive documents or images which had never previously been communicated over the platform. In the remainder of this section, we present the results of these experiments. Table 1 shows the results of our experiment testing for document and image surveillance on each of the three days it was conducted.

Although our experimental design did not explicitly contain a document control test , we reference one to be consistent with our presentation of the image test results.

Specifically, this test refers to our implicit results from investigating how document censorship worked on WeChat, which confirmed that WeChat lacked the capability to censor documents in real time see Section 2. Our results show that on each day of testing, if a sensitive document is first sent from a non-China-registered account to non-China-registered accounts, before sending it to a China-registered account, they are censored in real time when sent to a China-registered account.

This finding shows that documents sent even entirely among non-China-registered accounts undergo content surveillance and that these documents are used to build-up the censorship system to which China-registered accounts are subjected. Unlike with documents, we observed that WeChat can sometimes censor images in real time. However, if we first sent them from a non-China-registered account to other non-China-registered accounts, then all 60 out of 60 images were censored in real-time when sent to a China-registered account.

To confirm that the difference in these two results are statistically significant, we performed a chi-squared test under the null hypothesis that sending images from non-China-registered accounts to non-China-registered accounts does not affect the probability that they will be censored in real time when they are later sent to a China-registered account. This result shows that, in addition to documents, images sent even entirely among non-China-registered accounts also undergo content surveillance, and that images sent among non-China-registered accounts are also used to build-up the censorship system to which China-registered accounts are subjected.

At no point during testing were any of our test accounts banned for sending this number of images. Moreover, choosing this number yielded highly significant results. These findings show that sending 60 images across three different days is powerful enough to result in statistically significant results and suggests that an even smaller value of n could be used in future experiments to further minimize risk of account closure.

In Section 2. Unlike documents, novel images were sometimes censored in real time when sent over WeChat for the first time. Consequently, we used statistical methods to show that such images were increasingly censored when previously exposed to surveillance. In this section, we present an alternative experiment that does not require statistical analysis and which further confirms the findings of the past experiment. The method of our follow-up experiment, the collision experiment , takes advantage of the fact that WeChat uses MD5 as its file hash algorithm and that this hash function has known vulnerabilities relating to hash collisions.

Our method in the collision experiment is similar to the statistical experiment described in Section 2. In this experiment, we never send a sensitive image in the China group chat. Instead, we send a non-sensitive image that has been specially crafted to have the same MD5 hash as that of a novel, sensitive image. Table 2: The sensitive left and non-sensitive right seed images used in our experiment.

Examples of MD5 hash collisions are here 23 left and here 24 right. We then compare the number of censored images from the image collision side-channel test to that of the following test:. Like in the image experiment performed in Section 2.

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In fact, in this experiment, since we send only non-sensitive images in the collision control test , if there is surveillance, then we expect that all non-sensitive images will be censored in the collision side-channel test and that none of the non-sensitive images will be censored in the collision control test. We performed this experiment on January 30, , on a University of Toronto network in Toronto, Canada. Unlike with our statistical experiment, we performed the collision experiment on a single day because this experiment does not require measuring a large number of image transmissions.

In the collision side-channel test , all 20 of the 20 non-sensitive images were censored, whereas in the collision control test none of the 20 non-sensitive images were censored. WeChat provides a feature to recall 26 a message which lets users delete a chat message that has been sent within the last two minutes to prevent users from viewing it if they have not viewed the message already.

In this section, we design and perform an experiment to evaluate whether, after a chat message containing a file is recalled, WeChat still retains its hash in the hash index.

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To test whether WeChat retains a hash of a recalled file, we perform the following test:. We performed this experiment on January 7, , on a University of Toronto network in Toronto, Canada. To test if the results would be different for European Union users, we repeated this experiment on January 9, , using a WeChat account registered to a Belgian phone number and using a VPN server in Belgium. On each day of testing, we ran the test five times. For both days of testing, in all five tests, the recalled document was never received by the China-registered account. Our experiments reveal that content surveillance is applied to both China-registered accounts as well as to non-China-registered accounts.

Content surveillance between users of non-China-registered accounts is functionally undetectable unless those users conduct their own side-channel research to detect whether the documents or images that they shared have both been hashed for censorship purposes and, also, that the hashed documents or images are actually being censored. Put another way, in cases where documents or images are hashed but the files themselves are not presently censored, it would not be possible to know which, if any, files had been analyzed and hashed for potential censorship activities using the experiments we performed.

While there is a system in place to monitor and generate hashes for the documents and images transmitted between non-China-registered accounts for content which raises social or political concerns in China, our research has not demonstrated that there is an equivalent application of a censorship system in place for the communications which take place between non-China-registered accounts.

Put plainly, we have not witnessed censorship between non-China-registered accounts of materials which are censored among China-registered accounts. By conducting our side-channel experiment, we were nevertheless able to measure the existence of content surveillance for such materials transmitted among non-China-registered accounts.



Moreover, the experiments show that non-China-registered accounts cannot remove hashes of sensitive content which they have sent when communicating entirely with other international users as a side effect of recalling their content. Consequently, while it may appear to users that they can recall the content of their communications, at least some of the metadata associated with such communications—such as the hashes of sensitive files—are disassociated from the retraction system.

It is unclear based on our technical findings whether such a hash register would be associated with individual accounts. Finally, our experiments conducted on multiple days across November — January consistently show content surveillance of documents and images sent among non-China-registered users. Although such surveillance was consistently observed on each day of testing, we cannot speak to whether such surveillance was consistently applied across days which were not tested. These public-facing documents are intended to inform users about how their data will be used and protected.

For this report, we analyzed the international i. Overall, we found, first, that neither the China nor international public policy documents made clear to users that non-China accounts could have their content surveilled and the resulting hashes used to censor content for China-registered accounts. We specifically downloaded the following policies which apply to China-registered WeChat accounts:. Each of these documents are available in several languages, including English, simplified Chinese, and traditional Chinese. We assessed the collected privacy policies, terms of service documents, and acceptable use policies using a structured question set.

This question set is based on similar assessments that Citizen Lab researchers have conducted in the past of telecommunications companies, fitness tracker companies, online dating companies, and stalkerware companies. The letter contained eight core questions; a copy of the letter is available in Appendix A. Specifically, we contacted the company after completing our experiments that showed communications between non-China registered accounts were used to develop, enhance, or maintain the hash index that is used to censor content between China-registered account users.

The following sections present the most significant findings that emerged from our policy assessment. WeChat China and WeChat International both included references to the national laws and regulations with which the respective entities comply. However, in cases of US-based users, the governing law and dispute resolution would take place in the state or federal courts of California, with trial by jury and class action legal proceedings waived as a condition of using the service. However, the entities did not always provide links to the relevant documents to which they referred.

While WeChat China linked to its terms of services in its privacy policy, its privacy policy did not provide links to the terms of services.

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In the case of WeChat International, its terms of service included links to the privacy policy, and vice versa. WeChat China noted when the last updated date and effective date were for its privacy policy but it did not do so for its terms of service. WeChat International provided information about when each of the respective documents was last updated. Are they really working during working hour? In the above cases, it is quite acceptable to spy on their social activities, especially on WeChat.

You can easily read all the WeChat conversations still if it gets deleted by your children or employees. WeChat tracker allow you to view the entire media share or save on the targeted phones like photos, videos, audios, and documents. Stay in the know, on the go Track and monitor your shipments in real-time, anytime, anywhere.